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FIXED RATE CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
POWER AND NATURAL GAS ACTS
DAVID C. HJELMFELT
Under the Federal Power Act' and the Natural Gas Act, 2 the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, like its predecessor the Federal Power Com-
mission,3 is empowered to review the lawfulness of rates set in the first in-
stance by private parties. If the rates are found to be unjust, they may be set
at a lawful level by the commission. 4 Both acts prescribe procedures for
changes in rates, but neither abrogates the power of private parties to set
rates contractually. A problem that has arisen with surprising frequency is
the interpretation of the language of private contracts to determine whether
a party to the contract, typically the seller, may unilaterally initiate a rate
change.
In general terms, both Acts require entities subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction to file their rates with the Commission 5 and charge only the filed
rates.6 When an initial rate is filed with the Commission, it becomes effec-
tive upon thirty days notice 7 subject to the power of the Commission to hold
1. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
3. In 1977 the Federal Power Commission ceased to exist pursuant to the provisions of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 301(b), 91 Stat. 565 (1977) and
Exec. Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267 (1977) and its functions were transferred, in perti-
nent part, to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
4. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956).
5. The Federal Power Act provides:
Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every public util-
ity shall file with the Commission, within such time and in such form as the Commis-
sion may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public
inspection schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission or sale subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regula-
tions affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner
affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1976). The Natural Gas Act provides:
Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas
company shall file with the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days
from June 21, 1938) and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall
keep open in convenient form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all
rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and
charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates,
charges, classifications, and services.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1976).
6. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. North-Western Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
7. The Federal Power Act provides in pertinent part: "Unless the Commission otherwise
orders, no change shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or
service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to
the Commission and to the public." 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976). This provision applies to
initial rates as well as changes in existing rates. American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 546 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Natural Gas Act provides in pertinent part: "Unless the Commission otherwise orders,
no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or
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a hearing to determine whether the rate is just and reasonable and not un-
duly discriminatory and therefore lawful. If the initial rate is found to be
unlawful, the Commission may prescribe rates to be in effect from the date
of its order. 8 When a change in existing rates is filed, the Commission may
either allow the changed rate to become effective immediately and hold a
hearing to determine whether the rate is lawful or suspend the rate for up to
five months while holding a hearing to determine whether the rate is lawful.
In the former situation, any rate change ordered after hearing is prospective
only, while in the latter situation, any reduction in the new rate ordered by
the Commission relates back to the effective date of the new rate filing; in
addition the Commission may order any excessive rates received by the
Company to be refunded.9
service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to
the Commission and to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1976).
8. The Federal Power Act provides:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon com-
plaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged,
or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to thejurisdiction
of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such
rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classifica-
tion, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and,
shall fix the same by order.
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1976).
The Natural Gas Act provides:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon com-
plaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall
find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected
by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural
gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, prac-
tice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however,
That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained
in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Com-
mission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natu-
ral gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are
unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest
reasonable rates.
15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
9. The Federal Power Act provides:
Suspension of new rates; hearings; five month period.
Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority,
either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and, if it
so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the public utility, but upon reason-
able notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge,
classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the
Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the public utility af-
fected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend
the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or
service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would
otherwise go into effect; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the
rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such
orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had
become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the
expiration of such five months, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or
service shall go into effect at the end of such period, but in case of a proposed increased
rate or charge, the Commission may by order require the interested public utility or
public utilities to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of
such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and
[Vol. 57:4
1980] FIXED RATE CONTRACTS
Suppose that a natural gas pipeline has contracted with a natural gas
distributor to sell gas to the distributor for a set rate for an agreed upon
number of years. Do the rate provisions of the Natural Gas Act permit the
pipeline company to unilaterally file a rate schedule imposing higher rates
during the term of the contract? The Federal Power Commission thought
so, and held that section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act,' 0 requiring thirty days
notice of filing of new rates, authorized such a unilateral contract change.
The Supreme Court reversed in United Gas Pie Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service
Corp." stating that section 4(d) only provides the method by which rate
changes can be made and says nothing at all about when rate changes can
be made. According to the Court, the Natural Gas Act is a single statutory
scheme under which all rates are established initially by the natural gas com-
panies, by contract or otherwise, and reviewed by the Commission. The Act
proposes neither to define nor grant the initial rate setting powers of natural
gas companies.
The same day that the Court decided the Mobile case under the Natural
Gas Act, it decided the companion case Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pa-
cific Power Co.' 2 under the Federal Power Act. Sierra purchased power from
upon completion of the hearing and decision may by further order require such public
utility or public utilities to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such
amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision
shall be found not justified. At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be
increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and
reasonable shall be upon the public utility, and the Commission shall give to the hear-
ing and decision of such questions peference over other questions pending before it
and decide the same as speedily as possible.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976). The Natural Gas Act provides:
Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority
either upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distribut-
ing company, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders,
without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable
notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classifi-
cation, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commis-
sion, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company
affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend
the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or
service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would
otherwise go into effect; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the
rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such
orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had
become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the
expiration of the suspension period, on motion of the natural-gas company making the
filing, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go into effect.
Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by
order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond, to be approved by the Com-
mission, to refund any amounts ordered by the Commission, to keep accurate accounts
in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in
whose behalf such amounts were paid, and upon completion of the hearing and deci-
sion, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with interest, the portion of such
increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified. At any hearing involving
a rate or charge sought to be increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased
rate or charge is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company, and the
Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over
other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1976).
11. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
12. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for resale to consumers. In 1947,
Sierra began to negotiate for an alternate and less expensive source of power
from the Bureau of Reclamation's generator at Shasta Dam. To forestall
such competition, PG&E offered Sierra a special low rate for a fifteen year
term. Sierra accepted PG&E's offer in 1948. In 1953 when power from
Shasta Dam was no longer available, PG&E filed unilaterally with the Com-
mission a twenty-eight percent rate increase pursuant to section 205(d) of the
Federal Power Act. The Commission accepted the rates for filing, suspended
them, and commenced a proceeding to review the rates under section 205(e)
of the Act.13 Sierra appealed, arguing that the parties' contract precluded a
unilateral rate filing.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission on the grounds
that the Federal Power Act, like the Natural Gas Act, does not abrogate
fixed rate contracts. Accordingly, it was error for the Commission to have
accepted the rate for filing and proceeded under section 205(e).
14
PG&E and the Commission also argued that in finally approving the
new rates, the Commission had found by implication that the contract rate
was unjust and unreasonable and therefore the new rates should be allowed
prospectively under section 206 of the Act.1 5 The Court rejected this argu-
ment also, noting that as a condition precedent to changing a rate prospec-
tively under section 206, the Commission must first find that the existing
rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential. How-
ever, the purpose of section 206 is the protection of the public interest.
Therefore the Court held that a contract rate may not be said to be unjust or
unreasonable simply because it is unprofitable to the public utility.
[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose
upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair
return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree
by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it
does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. [ci-
tation omitted] In such circumstances the sole concern of the Com-
mission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely
affect the public interest-as where it might impair the financial
ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other
consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.
1 6
In one of the first tests of the scope of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division argued that its contract with
United Gas Pipe Line Company for a wholesale supply of gas at a desig-
nated rate "or any effective superceding rate schedules" on file with the
Commission was a fixed rate contract. 17 Memphis argued that the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine precluded the acceptance for filing of a rate change under
section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act' 8 unless the parties mutually agreed to
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1976).
16. 350 U.S. at 355 (emphasis in the original).
17. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
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the rate change. All other rate changes had to be processed under section
5(a) of the Act' 9 with only prospective application. The Commission held
that the contract was for sales at United's "going rate" and that unilateral
filings under section 4(e) were permissible.
The court of appeals reversed, citing Memphis. The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that United had reserved the right to
make unilateral rate changes and that section 4(e) of the Act did not pre-
clude a contractual reservation of the right by either party to make unilat-
eral rate changes.
20
The holding of the Sierra, Mobile and Memphis cases has been character-
ized as "refreshingly simple. The contract between the parties governs the
legality of the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are
valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are invalid."
'2 1
Refreshingly simple or not, since its inception in 1956 the Mobile-Sierra doc-
trine has been the subject of considerable litigation and has given rise to
some intriguing questions concerning rate discrimination.
RATES SUBJECT TO THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE
It is clear that changes in rates filed with the Commission are subject to
the Mobile-Siera doctrine, but what of rates not filed or erroneously accepted
for filing?
Prior to 1954, the rates charged by natural gas producers were not con-
sidered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 22 Producer rates
were arrived at contractually but were not filed with the Commission. In
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America . Harrngton,
23 the court was called upon to
decide whether, after Commission jurisdiction was established, a producer
might increase its rates when its contract did not permit unilateral rate
changes. The court concluded that there was nothing in the Natural Gas
Act or in the orders of the Federal Power Commission to indicate that in
such circumstances there was no effective or lawful rate prior to filing of the
rate. Accordingly, under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine the contract rate even
though unfiled became and remained the only lawful rate until changed by
the order of the Commission.
In another case involving Natural Gas Pipeline Company, the Third
Circuit held that the fact that the Mobile case dealt with an attempt to super-
sede an already filed rate and that the instant case dealt with the filing of an
initial rate was an immaterial difference. Thus the unilateral filing of an
initial rate over the protest of the other contracting party could not annul
19. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
20. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
The court of appeals decision created a chaotic condition in the bond market because of the
restriction it placed on rate increases. See YOUNG, FORTY YEARS OF PUBLIC UTILITY FINANCE
(1965).
21. Richmond Power & Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 414 U.S.
1068 (1973).
22. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
23. 246 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1957).
1980]
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the rate established by the unfiled contract.2 4 This is true even if the higher
rate had actually been used for billing purposes.
25
Despite the two Natural Gas Pipeline cases which made clear that Mobile-
Sierra applied to unfiled as well as filed rates, the Commission has tried to
evade the rule in dealing with electric rates. In Borough of Lansdale v. Federal
Power Commission,26 the parties had executed a fixed rate contract which was
duly offered for filing with the Commission. The Commission refused to
accept the contract for filing on the grounds that fixed rate contracts were
presumptively invalid. Subsequently, the company filed a new rate schedule
at higher rates and Lansdale protested, arguing that the new rates were
barred by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. The Commission rejected the Mobile-
Sierra argument, stating that the doctrine applied only to contracts previ-
ously accepted as lawful by the Commission. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
reversed, holding that the doctrine applied whether the company had
properly filed the contract or not and that it applied to contracts not previ-
ously approved by the Commission.
In Cqy of Clevelando. Federal Power Commission,2 7 the Commission refused
to consider the city's Mobile-Sierra contentions. The city had negotiated a
rate for load-transfer service from the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com-
pany and the city council had enacted an ordinance authorizing the city to
enter into a contract for the service at those rates. The company prepared a
letter agreement containing a higher schedule of rates, which the city signed.
The company then filed the letter agreement with the Commission. Subse-
quently, the city protested, claiming that the filed rate was not the agreed
upon rate. The Commission refused to consider the city's argument claim-
ing that a party could not go behind the filed rate.28 On appeal the court
reversed and remanded holding that "the proposition that a filed rate vari-
ant from an agreed rate is nonetheless the legal rate wages war with basic
premises of the Federal Power Act,"'29 "that a contracted rate cannot be
changed by the unilateral act of either party to the contract," 30 and "that a
utility is no more at liberty to alter an agreed rate as yet unfiled than it is to
depart from one that has been filed.
' ' 3 1
In Sam Rayburn Dam Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,32 the
parties had a fixed rate contract for a stated amount of power. The contract
was on file with the Commission. Over the years, the parties had in fact
bought and sold power under the contract rate in amounts greatly in excess
24. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
927 (1958); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 543 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Mobile-Sierra doctrine
applies to certificate proceedings under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act).
25. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
26. 494 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. 525 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28. More recently the Commission has held that Mobile-Sierra allegations are so fundamen-
tal to the power to accept rates for filing that the issue can be raised at any time. Columbus &
S. Ohio Elec. Co., Docket No. EN 77-529, FERC Order modifying Prior Order (Feb. 2, 1978).
29. City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d at 854-55.
30. Id. at 855.
31. Id. at 856.
32. 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
[Vol. 57:4
FIXED RATE CONTRACTS
of the contract amount. The seller then filed a rate increase to apply to all
amounts sold in excess of the contract amount. Mid-South Electric-Cooper-
ative argued that the course of conduct had transformed the contract into an
all-requirements contract at a fixed rate. The Commission rejected Mid-
South's argument on the grounds that a contract on file could not be altered
by a course of conduct. On appeal the court reversed, holding that Mobile-
Sierra applied to the actual contract whether or not it was on file with the
Commission. It cannot now be argued tht the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is applic-
ble only to contracts already filed with the Commission.
CONTRACTS CONSTRUED
The first step when a Mobile-Sierra issue is raised is to determine whether
the contract provides for sales at a fixed rate as in Mobile and Sierra or at the
"going rate" as in Memphis.
Interpreting contract language dealing with the right to make rate
changes "involves matters peculiarly within the area of the Commission's
special competence." 33 Nevertheless the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has pointed out that "[t]he FPC's distaste for the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine is well known, and it has been in the past necessary for this court to
remind the FPC that it is not free to ignore the doctrine."'34 In practice, the
court has given lip service to approaching the Commission's determination
with deference while making its own determination. 35 The Seventh Circuit
has said that it is "at least as capable of interpreting the effect of [the] con-
tract as the Commission."
36
The normal rules of contract interpretation are applicable and resort to
extrinsic evidence is permitted only in cases of ambiguity.37 However, the
Federal Power Commission's construction of conract language, colored by its
"distaste" for the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, has led to several stinging rever-
sals.38 With this background, a review of the interpretation of various con-
tracts should assist contract draftsmen to avoid undesired results in future
cases.
In Nevada Natural Gas Poe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, the court
held that the following contract language permitted the filing of a unilateral
rate increase: "The rates contained in aforesaid rate schedule on file with
said Commission and in effect at the time of commencement of service here-
under shall be the rates to be paid by Buyer to Seller under this agreement
33. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. at 114.
34. Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
35. City of Kaukauna v. FPC, 581 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sam Rayburn Dam Elec.
Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
36. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1210 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978).
37. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978); Appalachian Power Co. v.
FPC, 529 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop.
v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
38. Borough of Lansdale v. FPC, 494 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Richmond Power &
Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); Sam Rayburn Dam
Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
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until the same are changed in accordance with lawful requirements. '3 9
The court said the contract was typical of "tariff-and-service arrange-
ments," which, like the "going rate" contract in Memphis, did not preclude a
unilateral rate filing.
Another example of contract language creating an unambiguous right
to make a unilateral filing was quoted in Pubh'c Service Company of Indiana v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (PSCI) as follows:
The terms and conditions of this Agreement, and the provisions of
the rates attached hereto and made a part hereof, may be changed
by the Company from time to time by filing such change(s) with
the Federal Power Commission and upon receipt of such Commis-
sion's acceptance for filing will supercede [sic] and cancel the pres-
ent terms and conditions of this Agreement and such rate
provisions.
40
Although it would seem to be a simple enough task to contractually
reserve a right to make unilateral rate changes, that has not always been the
case. For example, a contract which stated that rate changes could be made
pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act and that the purchasing
city "agrees to accept such new or changed rates as are ultimately made
effective through such proceedings and review" was held to fall under the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine in Cty of Kaukauna v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion.4 ' The court held that, pursuant to the parties' contract, no rate in-
crease could become effective until finally approved by the Commission.
Section 205 does not dictate when a contractually-authorized rate increase
can be made effective. Beyond minimum statutory constraints, parties are
free to determine by contract when a rate change may become effective.
Contracts between Louisiana Power & Light Company and its whole-
sale customers, providing that the rates were subject to change "as a result of
and in accordance with" an order of a regulatory agency, were construed by
the Commission to permit unilateral rate changes but only prospectively
pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act.
4 2
Frequently wholesale customers have attempted to tie their rate to the
wholesale supplier's retail industrial rate to maintain their competitive posi-
tion and avoid a price squeeze. These attempts have created confusion re-
garding the right of the wholesale supplier to make unilateral rate filings.
For example, a contract providing that when an increase in the supplier's
retail industrial rate was approved by the Wisconsin Public Service Commis-
sion the wholesale customers would "automatically receive and accept such
rates" did not provide when the new rate would become effective. Rather,
39. 267 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1959).
40. 575 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. 581 F.2d 993, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
42. Louisiana Power & Light Co., FPC Docket No. ER-77-533, Order Rejecting Section
205 Filing, Amending Prior Order, Establishing Section 206(A) Proceedings, Granting Inter-
vention and Establishing Price Squeeze Procedures (Sept. 30, 1977). Accord, Kansas Power &
Light Co., FERC Docket No. ER 78-1, Order Accepting For Filing and Suspending Proposed
Increased Rates, Denying Motion to Reject, Granting Intervention and Establishing Procedures
Issued (Dec. 1, 1977) (contract provided for billing at rates "as may from time to time be au-
thorized by . . . any . . . regulatory body having jurisdiction").
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approval by the state commission was merely a triggering event permitting
the filing of new rates, which would become effective only after Commission
approval under section 205.
4
3
The City of Richmond, Indiana, had a contract with Indiana and
Michigan Electric Company (I&M) which provided for sales to Richmond
at I&M's industrial rate on file with the Indiana Commission. It was con-
ceded that when I&M filed for a ten percent increase in its industrial rate, it
could have sought a similar increase in its rate for sales to Richmond. In-
stead, I&M filed a new rate for sales to Richmond, increasing the rate by
forty-five percent. The Federal Power Commission permitted the filing, rea-
soning that since the contract concededly permitted a unilateral rate filing,
there was no Mobile-Sierra problem. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed,
holding that the parties had by contract limited the rate filing. 44 Moreover,
the court found no impermissible attempt to limit the Commission's jurisdic-
tion by a private contract.
In the Sam Dam4 5 case, the parties agreed that the "draftsmenship evi-
denced by the contract leaves much to be desired." The contract included
several rate provisions, each of which included a provision for renegotiation
of the rate. Following each renegotiation provision was a clause, 4(c), pro-
viding that if a rate change should be made applicable by final order or
acceptance for filing such changed rate would be the contract rate. The
Commission held that clause 4(c) provided for unilateral rate changes. Once
again the commission was reversed on appeal. The appellate court ruled
that clause 4(c) merely described the method of effectuating a rate resulting
from renegotiation.
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commis'sion,46 the parties had a
fixed rate contract with a capacity limitation of 8000 kw. Over the years,
Gulf routinely delivered power in excess of the contract amount by a factor
as great as eleven. In 1970, the parties amended the contract to remove the
capacity ceiling. In 1973, Gulf filed a unilateral rate increase. The Commis-
sion and the reviewing court agreed that when the parties eliminated the
capacity ceiling the fixed rate provision was applicable to all power sold.
The same result should have been reached on the basis of a course of conduct
change in the contract even without the formality of the 1970 contract
amendment.
4 7
Even the effective period of a fixed rate contract can cause problems. In
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co.,48 the fixed rate contract was executed
on February 9, 1976 with the rates made effective as of January 1, 1976. The
contract provided for successive one year fixed rate renewals absent prior
43. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., FPC Docket No. ER 76-303 and Wisconsin Michigan
Power Co., FPC Docket No. ER 76-394, Order Granting in Part and Denying In Part Applica-
tion for Rehearing and Granting Stay (Sept. 26, 1977).
44. Richmond Power & Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973).
45. Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976).
46. 518 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
47. See text accompanying note 32, supra.
48. FERC Docket No. ER 77-529, Order (modifying prior order) (Feb. 2, 1978).
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notice of termination or rate change. At issue was whether for Mobile-Serra
purposes the one year period began on January 1 or February 9. The Com-
mission held that the starting date was February 9.
An interesting evasion of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine occurred in Municipal
Electric Uth'y Association of Alabama v. Federal Power Commission.49 On Novem-
ber 1, 1971 Alabama Power Company filed new rates to become effective
upon the termination of some forty-six individual contracts which expired at
varying times between January 3, 1972 and April 1976. The new rates were
predicated upon a 1970 test year. The court said the filing did not violate
Mobile-Sierra because the new rates only became effective when the fixed rate
contracts expired. The problem of a stale test period,50 was theoretically
avoided by requiring the Commission to provide an opportunity for a modi-
fied section 205 hearing upon the expiration of each fixed rate contract. As a
result certain customers were forced to participate in a rate proceeding to
contest rates which, because of intervening rate proceedings, never did be-
come effective as to them. This unwarranted burden is one of the matters
sought to be avoided by fixed rate contracts. Nor did the Court consider the
rate discrimination which resulted from the varying contract termination
dates. That problem is discussed below.
CHANGING RATES IN A FIXED RATE CONTRACT
The rate established by a fixed rate contract may be changed prospec-
tively after a section 206 hearing under the Federal Power Act or a section 5
hearing under the Natural Gas Act. In such a proceeding
the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the
rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as where it
might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue
its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be
unduly discriminatory.
5 '
In practice, when the Commission has found a unilateral rate filing banned
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, it has not hesitated to order a section 206 hear-
ing.
5 2
The test set forth in Sierra is a difficult one. It is doubtful that the first
leg of the test, that is, whether the rates are so low as to impair the financial
ability of the public utility to continue its service, could ever be met.5 3 The
other two tests in Sierra are also difficult to satisfy.
One issue is whether Sierra imposed a test different from the test set out
49. 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 470 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., supra note 12.
52. Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978); Louisiana Power &
Light Co., FPC Docket No. ER 77-533 (Order issued Sept. 30, 1977); Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
FPC Opinion No. 791 (issued Apr. 6, 1977).
53. Wholesale sales typically represent less than 20% of an electric utility's business. The
wholesale customers of Commonwealth Edison, for example, account for less than 1% of the
company's revenues. Commonwealth Edison Co., FERC Docket Nos. E-9002 and ER 76-122.
When a single wholesale contract is involved the financial impact is likely to be d minr nis. Sales
to the Borough of Lansdale account for only .089% of the seller's total revenues. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., supra note 52.
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in section 206. In Philadephia Electrzc Co., 54 the Commission rejected the ar-
gument that the Sierra case definitely established the only three elements
bearing upon the public interest which would be sufficient to set aside rates
under section 206. Rather the Commission held that the public interest "is a
fluid concept, dynamic in nature, and necessarily discernible only within a
particular context once a full appreciation of all relevant facts is
achieved." '55 According to the Commission, the elements discussed in Sierra
were illustrative only.
56
The Commission then rejected the finding of the administrative judge
that a rate which recoups revenues insufficient to recover costs is necessarily
contrary to the public interest. 57 Rather, the Commission said that a public
utility may only be excused from its contractual obligations where it is
demonstrated that the public, which it has a duty to serve, will as a whole be
seriously disadvantaged if the commitment is allowed to run its full course.
Moreover in assessing the impact of the fixed rate, it may be necessary in
some cases to look at the impact on the company over the entire term of the
contract. In the early years the rate may be more than compensatory, miti-
gating in some degree a later revenue deficiency under the rate.
58 As inter-
preted by the Commission, changing a fixed rate under section 206 is a very
unlikely event.
Public Service Company of Indiana (PSCI), appealing a rate proceed-
ing, argued that its fixed rate contracts should be changed as unduly dis-
criminatory.5 9 PSCI's contract permitted unilateral rate changes by its
supplier, while its contract with four other cities did not permit rate changes
during the term of the contract. PSCI argued in the section 206 proceeding
that the fixed rate contracts were unduly discriminatory and should be in-
creased. The court, applying the Sierra test, rejected PSCI's argument, not-
ing that a rate may be excessively discriminatory under section 205 but not
unduly discriminatory under section 206. The purpose of section 205 is pro-
tection of the consumer, while the purpose of section 206 is protection of the
public interest.
The court then explained the difference in application of the two sec-
tions as follows:
In our view the anti-discrimination policy in section 205(b) is vio-
lated in a case such as this where one consumer has its rates raised
significantly above what other similarly-situated consumers are
paying. In such a case, the lone consumer would be placed in an
unjustifiably non-competitive position, and thus should have re-
course to the FPC under section 205(b). Section 206's ban on dis-
crimination may be breached in a case where one consumer is
afforded, without any factual justification, a contract rate that is
54. Philadelphia Elec. Co., FPC Opinion No. 791 (Apr. 6, 1977).
55. Id. at 12.
56. It was assumed without analysis that the elements set forth in Serra governed but were
to be applied in the alternative, in Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978).
57. A contract may not be said to be unjust or unreasonable under § 206 simply because it
is unprofitable to the public utility. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
58. Philadelphia Elec. Co., FPC Opinion No. 791 (issued Apr. 6, 1977).
59. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978).
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significantly lower than the pre-existing rates for all other members
of the class. In that case the public interest in avoiding blatant
favoritism by a regulated utility and in protecting the vast majority
of the class of consumers may require the FPC to find a violation of
section 206.60
Given the difficulty of changing a fixed rate contract under section 206
of the Federal Power Act or section 5 of the Natural Gas Act, the problem
arises as to what to do with rate differentials between customers which exist
solely because some customers of a supplier have fixed rate contracts while
others have going rate contracts. This problem is discussed in the following
section.
RATE DISCRIMINATION
In the PSCI rate proceeding discussed above, PSCI served a group of
five cities at wholesale rates. Four of the cities had fixed rate contracts and
Frankfurt, the remaining city, had a going rate contract. Both the Commis-
sion and the reviewing court refused to increase the rates to the fixed rate
cities after a section 206 hearing. This caused Frankfurt to pay significantly
higher rates than the fixed rate cities. Frankfurt argued that the result was
rate discrimination prohibited by section 205. The Commission rejected
Frankfurt's contention, but the reviewing court reversed and remanded.
6 1
Differences in rates are justified where they are predicated upon differences
in facts. 6 2 In this case the Commission determined that the existence of the
contracts constituted such a factual difference. Since the rates were other-
wise just and reasonable, it permitted the increased rates.
The court held that the Commission was not responsive to the statutory
test. Once Frankfurt demonstrated a substantial rate disparity, it was in-
cumbent upon PSCI to show factual differences that justified the specific
rate differential. 63 The Commission's failure to tie factual differences to the
nature and amount of the rate differential in its opinion required a re-
mand.64 The court went on to state that matters that might justify a rate
differential included the length of the contract term, since discounts can be
justified on the basis of long-term commitments.
65
However, both the Commission in Kansas Power & Ligh166 and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Boroughs of Chambersburg v.
Federal Energy Regulatoty Commissz'on67 have disagreed with the result reached
in the PSCI case. Both have held that a rate differential which exists by
virtue of the fact that one customer had a fixed rate contract while others
had going rate contracts, where no other factual difference is demonstrated,
is not discriminatory. In such cases, the contractual differences alone justify
60. Id. at 1213.
61. Id. at 1222.
62. St. Michaels Util. Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967).
63. 575 F.2d at 1212.
64. Id. at 1213.
65. Id. at 1212 n. 12.
66. See note 42, supra.
67. 580 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the difference sufficiently for section 205. Further the court found that the
necessary result of the Mobile, Sierra and Memphis cases is a potential for rate
discrimination which can not be unreasonable if it exists solely as a result of
contracts.
In PSCI, the court attempted to distinguish the Chambersburg case factu-
ally.68 The court noted that in PSCI only one city had a going rate contract
while in Chambersburg only one city had a fixed rate contract. Further, in
PSCI the Commission had agreed that Frankfurt would be significantly in-
jured by the rate differential while no such finding was made in Chambers-
burg. In a section 205 proceeding to protect the consumer, the number of
consumers injured should make no difference. Accordingly the first factual
distinction is irrelevant. The second distinction goes to the question of
whether there is in fact an undue preference or an unreasonable difference in
rates.
There exists then a fundamental divergence between the Seventh Cir-
cuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the existence of undue rate discrimina-
tion resulting from the applicability of Mobile-Sterra to some but not all of a
supplier's wholesale contracts. On the one hand, it is clear that a significant
rate disparity not predicated on cost-of-service differences may result. On
the other hand, it is argued that the company should not be deprived of the
benefit of its bargained for going rate contract simply because some of its
customers had fixed rate contracts. Both arguments are appealing.
The resolution of the dispute between the circuits lies in the develop-
ment of a more exhaustive record regarding the inception of the contractual
differences. The damage from the discrimination does not arise until one
consumer has experience a rate increase. No relief is appropriate until that
event occurs. However, the discriminatory event occurred when different
contracts were executed. Accordingly, when no cost-of-service justification
for the rate differential appears, it is necessary to consider the facts surround-
ing the execution of the contracts. In this regard, it would be appropriate to
consider whether the going rate customers had the option of signing fixed
rate contracts. Other differences in the contracts may also justify the distinc-
tion.
When it is recognized the wholesale suppliers frequently have a monop-
oly position in dealing with a wholesale customer the potential for discrimi-
nation at the inception of the contracts is apparent. 69 In such situations one
of the customers of a wholesale supplier may be so fortuitously situated as to
have an alternative supplier. To keep that customer, the supplier may offer
a fixed rate contract which it will not offer to customers who are not geo-
graphically situated so as to have a choice among suppliers. It appears that
such evidence would be considered by the D.C. Circuit.
When rate discrimination is demonstrated, the remedy in cases under
section 205 has been to reduce the level of the higher rate to the level of the
68. 575 F.2d at 1212 n.12.
69. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Consumers Power Co.,
ALAB-452, 6 N.R.C. 892 (1972); Toledo Edison Company, ALAB-560, - N.R.C. - (Sept. 6,
1979), appealed docketed, Duquesne Light Co., No. 80-1295 (3d Cir., Feb. 29, 1980).
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lower rate.70 This remedy would remove the damage resulting from discrim-
ination at the inception of the contracts.
CONCLUSION
The law regarding the application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is suffi-
ciently clear that most problems can be avoided by careful contract drafting.
When the existence of both fixed rate and going rate contracts produces a
significant rate differential not resulting from cost-of-service differences, a
full record regarding the contract negotiations should be developed to per-
mit a determination of whether section 205 discrimination exists.
70. Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134 (1940).
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